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FOREWORD
THE BOOKS OF THE JUSTICES
By Linda Greenhouse*
Introduction: Two Justices
On June 27, 1979, the Supreme Court upheld an affirmative-action plan
that set aside half the places in a steel industry training program for African
American steelworkers.1 This is how then–Associate Justice William H.
Rehnquist began his dissenting opinion in the case, United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber:
In a very real sense, the Court’s opinion is ahead of its time: it could
more appropriately have been handed down five years from now, in 1984, a
year coinciding with the title of a book from which the Court’s opinion
borrows, perhaps subconsciously, at least one idea. Orwell describes in his
book a governmental official of Oceania, one of the three great world pow-
ers, denouncing the current enemy, Eurasia, to an assembled crowd . . . .2
Justice Rehnquist went on to recount how, in the novel, the Oceania
official is handed a slip of paper and seamlessly redirects the crowd’s atten-
tion to the new enemy, Eastasia.3 “Today’s decision,” Justice Rehnquist con-
tinued, “represents an equally dramatic and equally unremarked switch in
this Court’s interpretation of Title VII.”4 While the Civil Rights Act’s em-
ployment provision had been previously understood to “prohibit racial dis-
crimination in employment simpliciter,” he wrote, it was now being invoked,
to the contrary, as a shield for a racial quota.5
From this reference to George Orwell’s iconic novel of a dystopian fu-
ture, we learn several things. Clearly, Justice Rehnquist was familiar with the
book and had most likely even read it, along with most readers of Supreme
Court opinions. He thus had reason to expect the reference to resonate with
* Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School. Thanks to Ganesh N. Sitaraman
for many enjoyable conversations about this project and to Julie Graves Krishnaswami of the
Yale Law Library for her valuable assistance.
1. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
2. Id. at 219–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-
Four 181–82 (1949)). Due to recent political events, Orwell’s novel has shot to the top of
Amazon’s best-seller list. Michiko Kakutani, Why ‘1984’ Is a 2017 Must-Read, N.Y. Times (Jan.
26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/books/why-1984-is-a-2017-must-read.html
[https://perma.cc/PXD9-Y5HW].
3. United Steelworkers, 433 U.S. at 219–20.
4. Id. at 220.
5. See id. at 220–21.
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his audience, and that invoking it would provide a dramatic image of a
world turned cynically upside down. And by invoking a key scene familiar to
all readers of the novel, he could suggest, without having to say so explicitly,
that the majority was not simply wrong on a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, but that it was deliberately, mischievously, even deviously wrong.
Fast forward thirty-seven years to this past June and to a very different
justice who also sought to dramatize what she viewed as a majority opin-
ion’s profound error. Dissenting in Utah v. Strieff,6 an exclusionary-rule case
in which the majority refused to suppress evidence obtained after a suspi-
cionless and concededly unlawful police stop, Justice Sonia Sotomayor put a
shelf of books on display. These included classics of African American litera-
ture (W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, and James Baldwin, The Fire
Next Time) as well as modern scholarship (Michelle Alexander, The New Jim
Crow, and Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, The Miner’s Canary) along with
a current best-selling memoir, Between the World and Me by Ta-Nehisi
Coates.7
Justice Sotomayor cited ten books in all, of which the more recent ones
concerned the impact of African Americans’ encounters with the criminal
justice system. The defendant in Utah v. Strieff happened to be white, a fact
Justice Sotomayor used to rhetorical advantage: “The white defendant in this
case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated in this manner,” she wrote.8
The case, she continued,
tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer can
verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to
invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that you
are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just
waiting to be catalogued.9
If Justice Sotomayor’s goal was to add force to her dissent and make sure
the case would not be submerged by the tide of more eagerly anticipated
late-June opinions, there is no doubt that she succeeded. By the end of the
day on which it was issued (June 20, 2016), her dissent had received wide
and growing attention.10 Would it have achieved the same impact without
the books? From the way in which accounts of her dissent singled out the
books for special attention, the answer is almost certainly “no.”11
6. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
7. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2070.
9. Id. at 2070–71.
10. See, e.g., Matt Ford, Justice Sotomayor’s Ringing Dissent, Atlantic (June 20, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/ [https://
perma.cc/9CTH-STJ5].
11. E.g., Victoria M. Massie, You Need to Read Sonia Sotomayor’s Devastating, Ta-Nehisi
Coates-Citing Supreme Court Dissent, Vox (June 20, 2016, 12:49 PM), http://www.vox.com/
2016/6/20/11976560/sonia-sotomayor-dissent-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/LYQ8-2BXM].
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I. Justices and Their Books: An Overview
Justices cite books. Collectively, they cite many books: 132 separate
volumes during October Term (OT) 2015, with 41 of the Term’s 62 signed,
published opinions12 containing citations to books.13
For this Michigan Law Review issue devoted to recently published books
about law, I thought it would be interesting to see what books made an
appearance in the past year’s work of the Supreme Court. I catalogued every
citation to every book in those forty opinions in order to see what patterns
emerged: what books the justices cited, which justices cited which books,
and what use they made of the citations.14
To begin with, I should define what I mean by “books.” For the pur-
poses of this Foreword, I excluded some types of reading matter that may
have a book-like appearance or that others might view as a book: govern-
ment reports and statistical compilations, including the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines; the Model Penal Code; the Congressional Record; the Federal
Register; and other current compilations of statutes or regulatory codes. (I
include some older compilations as primary source material, e.g., a volume
of the Vermont State Papers 1779–1786, published in 1823 and cited by Chief
Justice Roberts.15) I also excluded monographs, databases, and reference
materials residing entirely on the Internet.
This left 132 books, which I categorized as follows:
Figure 1. Categories of Books Cited
Type Cited
Treatises and practice manuals 51
Primary sources, historical 27
History and political science 17
Law 16
Dictionaries 7
Restatements 6
Literature 5
Primary sources, modern 3
12. Excluded from this review are per curiam opinions, as well as concurrences with and
dissents from per curiam opinions.
13. All data in this Foreword come from my own statistical compilations, which are on
file with the Michigan Law Review. To the extent that judgment calls are involved (e.g., whether
to count an opinion “concurring in part and dissenting in part” as a concurrence or dissent),
my numbers may differ from those in other data sets.
14. Except where otherwise indicated, citations are counted as follows: multiple citations
to a single book within a single opinion (whether it be a concurrence, dissent, or opinion for
the Court) are counted as a single citation; in other words, repeat citations within a single
opinion (such as “id.” citations) are not counted as additional citations separate from the
original citation to the source. Citations to the same source across different opinions (even if
authored by the same justice), however, count as multiple citations. Also, citations to different
editions of the same book are treated as citations to the same book.
15. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1331 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Every justice cited at least several books during the Term, with the ex-
ception of Justice Scalia, who cited only one book—Black’s Law Diction-
ary—in the four opinions he produced (two for the Court and two in
dissent) before his death in February.16 But three of his colleagues (Justices
Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan) cited Justice Scalia’s 2012 collaboration
with Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts.17 In
fact, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan cited this book on opposite sides of the
same case.18
Having read many Supreme Court opinions over many years, I em-
barked on this project with only a few hunches about what I would find. For
one, I assumed that the Federalist Papers would make a strong showing—
and they did indeed during OT 15, with twelve of the papers garnering thir-
teen citations (although enthusiasm for the Federalist Papers was not partic-
ularly widespread, with eight of those citations coming from Justice
Thomas). I expected justices looking for a reliable history of the Revolution-
ary period to turn to Gordon Wood, and three of them did (Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Breyer).19 I did not, however, expect Jus-
tice Sotomayor’s citation-laden dissenting opinion in Utah v. Strieff.20 It
came as a gift.
There were other surprises as well. I was familiar with the oddly robust
literature on Supreme Court justices’ uses of dictionaries.21 A recent note in
16. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760,
784–89 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014));
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 737–44 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kansas v.
Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016); Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015).
17. See Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1097 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 962–63 (2016) (majority opinion by Sotomayor, J.);
Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 970 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
18. Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. 958. Justice Sotomayor cited Reading Law in her opinion for the
Court, see id. at 962–63, while Justice Kagan cited it in dissent, see id. at 970 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). Their dispute, which Scalia and Garner seem not to have resolved, was over which
canon of construction to apply when a modifier or other limiting clause comes at the end of a
sentence that contains a list of items such as criminal offenses. Compare id. at 962–66 (major-
ity opinion) (rejecting the defendant’s interpretation of the “rule of the last antecedent”), with
id. at 969–73 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reaching a contrary conclusion about the proper applica-
tion of the last-antecedent rule).
19. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787 (1969).
Chief Justice Roberts cited the book in his dissenting opinion in Bank Markazi, discussing the
judicial role played by colonial legislatures. 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1330 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing) (citing Wood, supra, at 154–55, for the colonial legislatures’ role). Justice Thomas cited
the book in his opinion in Evenwel v. Abbott. 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1137 (2016) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (citing Wood, supra, at 170, for the Framers’ belief in “equality of representation”).
Justice Breyer cited the book in his dissenting opinion in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. 136 S.
Ct. 1863, 1878 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The problem of sovereignty was not solved by
the Declaration of Independence.” (quoting Wood, supra, at 354)).
20. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
21. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 483, 486–87 n.4
(2013) (compiling sources).
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the Yale Law Journal, compiling data through 2013, concluded that Justice
Alito was “now the most frequent user of dictionaries on the Supreme
Court.”22 But in OT 15, Justice Alito was nowhere near the top of the list,
with only four citations to dictionaries, compared with Justice Sotomayor’s
ten, Justice Kagan’s eighteen, and Justice Thomas’s fourteen.
Individual citation practices vary widely, in suggestive ways. For exam-
ple, Justice Kennedy’s opinions contained by far the fewest citations.23 From
his omnipotent position at the center of the Court (insofar as an eight-
member Court has a center), perhaps Justice Kennedy had no need to reach
for outside authority in order to persuade others; he could sit back and
watch his colleagues compete for his vote. He published twelve opinions
during the term (nine for the Court, one in dissent, and two concurring),
citing books in only two of them, for a total of five citations: Blackstone,
cited three times in a single dissenting opinion,24 and four treatises.25 By
contrast, Justice Thomas’s thirty-seven opinions (seven for the Court, six-
teen in dissent, and fourteen concurrences) contained sixty-five citations,
with many references to historical sources, perhaps reflecting his belief that
the answer to any question lies somewhere in history.26
Because justices differ so greatly in their opinion production (although
majority opinion assignments are distributed roughly equally, justices are
free to write as many concurring and dissenting opinions as they like), the
raw numbers can be uninformative and even misleading. To give a more
accurate snapshot of the individual citation practices, I compiled a citation
ratio (CR), which is simply the number of book citations divided by the
number of opinions, for each justice. Although Justice Thomas’s sixty-five
citations were the most numerous, he did not emerge at the top of the cita-
tion ratio list, as shown here, from the lowest CR to the highest:
22. John Calhoun, Note, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and
Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 Yale L.J. 484, 508 (2014).
23. See infra Figure 2.
24. See Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1106–07 (2016) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries (1769)).
25. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1111 (citing 4 Austin Wakeman Scott, The Law of Trusts (2d
ed. 1956)); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045–46 (2016) (first citing 2
William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions (5th ed. 2012); then citing 7AA
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed. 2005)); and then
citing Manual for Complex Litigation (4th ed. 2004)).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 67, 81, 83.
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Figure 2. Citations, Opinions, and Citation Ratios by Justices
Justice Citations Opinions CR
Kennedy 5 12 0.41
Breyer 14 16 0.88
Ginsburg 19 16 1.19
Sotomayor 30 18 1.67
Thomas 65 37 1.76
Kagan 25 12 2.08
Roberts 24 11 2.18
Alito 38 16 2.38
Among the forty-one cases that cite any books, there was an average of
4.8 citations per case (by which I mean separate citations, not separate
books, since not infrequently, justices cite the same book or, as Justice Kagan
put it in Luna Torres v. Lynch, engage in “brandishing dictionaries”27).
There was little correlation between the prominence of a case and the
number of citations the opinions contained. For example, among the dozen
decisions with only one book citation was Fisher v. University of Texas,28
surely one of the Term’s most high-profile cases. Its paucity of citations re-
flected the fact that the majority opinion’s author was the citation-averse
Justice Kennedy. Justice Alito, as part of his argument in dissent, challenged
the university’s use of SAT scores as a measure of applicants’ academic qual-
ity.29 He bolstered his argument by citing a book of essays edited by a soci-
ologist, Joseph A. Soares, arguing against reliance on the SAT and making
the case for eliminating the test from the admissions process.30 Another of
the Term’s most prominent cases, the Texas abortion case Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, included no books about abortion, but instead con-
tained dueling citations to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and to civil
procedure treatises.31 These reflected the dispute between Justice Breyer for
the Court and Justice Alito in dissent about the case’s justiciability.
The case with the most citations, twenty-four, was Evenwel v. Abbott,
which held 8–0 that states may continue to draw their legislative districts
27. Luna Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1625 (2016). The battle of the dictionaries in
this statutory case about the definition of “aggravated felony” concerned the meaning of “de-
scribe.” See id.
28. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
29. See Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2233–35 (Alito, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2234 (citing SAT Wars: The Case for Test-Optional College Admissions
(Joseph A. Soares ed., 2012)).
31. See 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). Justice Breyer cited Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments (Am. Law. Inst. 1980), along with 29 Charles Alan Wright & Victor Gold, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure: Evidence (2016) and 18 Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 2002). See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at
2305–08, 2317. Justice Alito cited both the First and Second Restatements of Judgments, Re-
statement of Judgments (Am. Law. Inst. 1942) and Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments, supra, along with Charles Alan Wright et al., supra. See Whole Woman’s Health,
136 S. Ct. at 2332–53 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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based on total population and are not obliged to count only the number of
eligible voters.32 Not surprisingly for a case that called for an understanding
of constitutional history, Justice Ginsburg, for the Court, and Justices
Thomas and Alito, in opinions concurring in the judgment, all drew on
both primary and secondary historical sources. All three justices cited Far-
rand’s Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.33 While Justice Ginsburg
found it necessary to cite only one of the Federalist Papers (No. 54),34 Justice
Thomas threw in Numbers 1, 10, 14, 22, 39, 43, 51, and 62, along with the
papers of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson; Gordon Wood; Blackstone;
and Akhil Amar’s 2005 book, America’s Constitution: A Biography.35 Justice
Alito also cited Amar.36 These overlapping citations might lead one to ask
why the three justices couldn’t agree on a single opinion, but readers of
Evenwel will quickly see that while the three may have invoked the same
books, they were not on the same page.37
II. Why Cite a Book?
Why would a Supreme Court justice even bother to cite a book?
Shouldn’t factors internal to the case—stare decisis, legislative history, briefs
of the parties and amici—suffice to provide justices with the material they
need to reach a result and the ammunition they need to defend it?
The answer is yes, unless: Unless a justice wants to magnify the impact of
an opinion, as Justice Sotomayor did in her Utah v. Strieff dissent.38 Unless a
justice wants to surround a conclusion with presumably unimpeachable au-
thority as, for example, Justice Thomas did in his opinion for the Court in
Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health Benefit
Plan.39 “To resolve this issue, we turn to standard equity treatises,” he wrote
32. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
33. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1127 (majority opinion by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 1137
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1146 (Alito, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 1127 (majority opinion).
35. Id. at 1137–40 (Thomas, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 1149 (Alito, J., concurring).
37. All three justices cited the same passage in Farrand that recounts Alexander Hamil-
ton’s argument that Senate seats should be allocated by population. But each drew a different
conclusion about the relevance of Hamilton’s views to the question at hand. See id. at 1127
(majority opinion); id. at 1137 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1146 (Alito, J., concurring)
(each citing 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 473 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911)).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 6–11.
39. 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016).
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to introduce his reference to two treatises and a restatement volume.40 Cita-
tion to recognized authority can serve as armor, protecting a majority opin-
ion as it circulates in draft inside the Court, and it can add persuasive weight
once the opinion reaches the public.
One purpose for reading, of course, is to acquire information, and I’m
willing to assume that justices do occasionally turn to books for this reason.
In Sturgeon v. Frost, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous Court that
the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conserva-
tion Act failed to take account of the state’s unique characteristics.41 It’s easy
to picture the Chief Justice, a Harvard summa in American history,42 im-
mersing himself in the state’s colorful history, which he proceeded to de-
scribe with evident enthusiasm. His citations to a recently published history
of Alaska and to a 1972 account of the gold rush seem simply to attest to the
fact that he did some enjoyable homework.43
Justices may also cite to books to send a subtler message to specific audi-
ences, a kind of “dog whistle” meant for certain ears but likely to go unheard
by others.44 Justice Thomas sent such a coded message in his concurring
opinion in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, a patent case in which the
Court deferred to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in upholding one of
the PTO’s regulations.45 Given the administrative law context, Justice
Breyer’s opinion for the Court not surprisingly invoked the familiar rule of
Chevron deference.46 As he has in the past, Justice Thomas called in his con-
curring opinion for overturning Chevron.47 This time, he cited to a newly
published collection of essays entitled Liberty’s Nemesis: The Unchecked Ex-
pansion of the State, edited by two conservative luminaries, Dean Reuter, vice
president of the Federalist Society, and John Yoo, the law professor and for-
mer Justice Department official.48 To the general public, the book was surely
unknown. It was, however, a selection of the Conservative Book Club, and
40. Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 658–59 (first citing 4 John Norton Pomeroy, Equity Ju-
risprudence (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941); then citing Restatement of Restitu-
tion (Am. Law Inst. 1936); and then citing 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies (2d ed.
1993)).
41. 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070–72 (2016).
42. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr
[https://perma.cc/7ADK-P5HQ].
43. See Sturgeon, 136 S. Ct. at 1064–66 (first citing Claus-M. Naske & Herman E.
Slotnick, Alaska: A History (Univ. of Okla. Press 2011) (1979); and then citing David
Wharton, The Alaska Gold Rush (1972)).
44. For the “dog whistle” reference, see Ian Henry Lo´pez, Dog Whistle Politics: How
Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class 3–4
(2014).
45. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
46. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
47. See id. at 2148 (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. Id. (citing Liberty’s Nemesis: The Unchecked Expansion of the State (Dean
Reuter & John Yoo eds., 2016)).
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on April 25, the day the Cuozzo Speed Technologies case was argued, it was
the subject of a glowing review in National Review.49 The review called the
book an “indispensable guide” that “should be an essential part of any vet-
ting process to fill the seat vacated by the departed Justice Antonin Scalia”
and might even persuade the Supreme Court to “undo the damage of its
hundred years of servitude to the absolutism of the majority.”50 Critiques of
Chevron deference are hardly rare.51 By selecting this particular book to cite,
Justice Thomas was sending his base a strong signal of his sympathy and
availability.
Purely literary references in Supreme Court opinions are uncommon. In
OT 15 there were only five. The three in Justice Sotomayor’s Utah v. Strieff
dissent were, as explained earlier, put to serious rhetorical purpose.52 The
other two references, however, seem intended to amuse the opinion’s au-
thors. There was this from Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting in Bank Markazi
v. Peterson: “In reality, the Court’s ‘plenty’ is plenty of nothing, and, appar-
ently, nothing is plenty for the Court.”53 His citation, of course, was to the
libretto of Porgy and Bess.54 (The Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion in Bank
Markazi, in which the Court upheld an unusual 2012 law that ordered
49. Liberty’s Nemesis: The Unchecked Expansion of the State, Conservative Book Club,
http://www.conservativebookclub.com/book/libertys-nemesis-the-unchecked-expansion-of-
the-state [https://perma.cc/H9JJ-PEV8]; Mario Loyola, Leviathan Rising, Nat’l Rev. (Apr. 25,
2016), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2016-04-25-0100/john-yoo-dean-reuter-lib-
erty’s-nemesis [https://perma.cc/S88Z-XQBW].
50. Loyola, supra note 49.
51. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gor-
such, J., concurring).
52. See 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (first citing W.E.B. Du-
Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903); then citing James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time
(1963); and then citing Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me (2015)).
53. 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
54. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1335 (citing DuBose Heyward & Ira Gershwin, Porgy
and Bess: Libretto (1958)). The Chief Justice deployed the quote to refute the majority’s
assertion that the challenged law left “plenty” of factual matters for the district court to adju-
dicate. See id. at 1325 n.20 (majority opinion). This is not the first time the Chief Justice has
cited a lyric. In a 2008 case, Sprint Communications v. APCC Services, his dissenting opinion
argued that the respondents lacked Article III standing because they “never had any share” in
the amount of money at issue and thus “cannot benefit from the judgment they seek.” 554
U.S. 269, 301 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). He then offered: “When you got nothing, you
got nothing to lose.” Id. (citing Bob Dylan, Like a Rolling Stone (Columbia Records
1965)). In citing the future Nobel laureate, however, the Chief Justice mangled the quote. As
Adam Liptak later pointed out in the New York Times, the line actually begins, “When you
ain’t got nothing.” Adam Liptak, How Does It Feel, Chief Justice Roberts, to Hone a Dylan
Quote?, N.Y. Times (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/us/politics/how-
does-it-feel-chief-justice-roberts-to-hone-a-dylan-quote.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6J9D-
7ZJH]. Justice Scalia also quoted Dylan, although without any citation, or even quotation
marks. “The-times-they-are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty,” he wrote in a
partial concurrence in City of Ontario v. Quon. 560 U.S. 746, 768 (2010) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Judicial quotations from Dylan are frequent enough to have inspired a law review com-
pilation. See Alex B. Long, The Freewheelin’ Judiciary: A Bob Dylan Anthology, 38 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 1363 (2011).
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blocked Iranian assets released to satisfy a particular set of judgments, in-
cluded citations to twelve books, by far the most in any of his opinions.55 In
fact, without those twelve, the Chief Justice’s CR would have been only 1.09
instead of twice that number.56)
It’s undoubtedly questionable to refer to a Lonely Planet travel guide as
“literature,” but the other obvious choice—a separate category for travel
guides—is unappealing. In any event, Justice Kagan cited the publisher’s
guidebook to Brazil in her opinion for the Court in Luna Torres v. Lynch, an
immigration case, as part of the extended discussion of what it means for a
particular offense to be “described in” the federal criminal code.57 The ques-
tion in the case was whether an offense under state law could count as an
“aggravated felony” for federal immigration purposes even if it did not pre-
cisely track every element of the corresponding federal offense.58 Justice Ka-
gan answered the question in the affirmative with reference to a hypothetical
vacation trip that deviated in one particular from the itinerary described in
a travel guide.59 Without suggesting why she chose Brazil as a hypothetical
destination, Justice Kagan observed that “[i]t would be natural, for example,
to say . . . that a person followed the itinerary for a journey through Brazil
that is ‘described in’ a Lonely Planet guide if he traveled every leg of the tour
other than a brief ‘detour north to Petro´polis.’ ”60
Whether Justice Kagan’s analogy served to enlighten readers or, just as
likely, confuse them, it’s no doubt the case that justices who strive for acces-
sibility and quotability, as Justice Kagan and Chief Justice Roberts clearly do,
find that books can be useful tools.
Then there are the dictionaries. Why would a justice cite a dictionary?
Why do some (Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer) cite no dictionaries at all, while
others seem to have concluded that if it’s worth citing one dictionary, it’s
worth citing several? Voisine v. United States offers an example.61 Writing for
the Court, Justice Kagan deployed three dictionaries in search of the defini-
tion of the noun “use,” as in “use of force.”62 In dissent, Justice Thomas
searched two of the same dictionaries plus a third for the definition of
“force.”63 One might describe the two justices as citing past each other on
55. 136 S. Ct. at 1329–38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
56. See supra Figure 2.
57. 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1626 n.5 (2016) (citing On the Road: Destination Brazil, Lonely
Planet, http://media.lonelyplanet.com/shop/pdfs/brazil-8-getting-started.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FV39-HFM8]).
58. Luna Torres, 136 S. Ct. at 1623.
59. Id. at 1626 n.5.
60. Id. (citing On the Road: Destination Brazil, Lonely Planet, http://media.lonelyplanet
.com/shop/pdfs/brazil-8-getting-started.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV39-HFM8]).
61. 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016).
62. Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2278 (first citing Webster’s New International Dictionary
(2d ed. 1954); then citing The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d
ed. 1987); and then citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).
63. Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing The Random House Dictionary of
the English Language (2d ed. 1987); then citing Oxford English Dictionary (no edition
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their way to opposite conclusions about whether a misdemeanor conviction
for a “reckless” domestic assault triggers a federal statutory ban on firearms
possession. (The majority said yes; Justice Thomas, joined in part by Justice
Sotomayor, said no.64)
Justice Alito cited three dictionaries in his opinion for the Court in
Spokeo v. Robins.65 Discussing the question of Article III standing at the heart
of the case, he probed the distinction between “concrete” and intangible
harm:
We have made it clear time and time again that an injury in fact must be
both concrete and particularized . . . . A “concrete” injury must be “de
facto”; that is, it must actually exist. See Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th
ed. 2009). When we have used the adjective “concrete,” we have meant to
convey the usual meaning of the term—”real,” and not “abstract.” Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary 472 (1971); Random House Dic-
tionary of the English Language 305 (1967).66
(Justice Thomas used a concurring opinion in Spokeo to discuss the
common-law roots of the injury-in-fact requirement. He cited no dictiona-
ries, instead offering six references to Blackstone within his Spokeo
opinion.67)
Those who have studied the Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries have
expressed considerable skepticism about the practice. “[T]he risk is that
judges will overlook or ignore salient differences and instead engage in selec-
tive reliance on the particular dictionary, definition, or edition date that is
congenial to their notion of what the word should mean,” James J. Brudney
and Lawrence Baum wrote in a 2013 article on the emergence of what they
called the Court’s “pervasive dictionary culture.”68 They pointed to a second
problem:
There is a real risk that judges, in their search for correct or appropriate
definitions, will ignore background understandings about the words in dis-
pute. This larger background context often involves understandings from
the Congress that enacted the words, from agencies that have applied the
words, and even from the Court itself as it has construed the words in prior
decisions.69
Professors Brudney and Baum surveyed the use of dictionaries in 150
statutory cases from 1986 (the beginning of the Rehnquist Court) to 2011,
or date given); and then citing Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). Note that Justices
Kagan and Justice Thomas cite to two different editions of Black’s Law Dictionary.
64. Compare id. at 2280 (majority opinion), with id. at 2282 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
66. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
67. See id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 3–4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries).
68. Brudney & Baum, supra note 21, at 539, 565.
69. Id. at 565.
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with a focus on criminal, labor, and business law cases.70 They found the
justices’ use of dictionaries to be “highly subjective and ad hoc.”71 Justices
cited dictionaries in more than one-third of the cases, with no differences
among justices of different ideologies or interpretive methods.72 In the cases
they examined, the authors found that rather than constraining opinion-
writers in reaching a desired result, dictionaries served as “ornament[s]” to
“enhance the authoritative tone of the decision” or as “barrier[s]” that jus-
tify ignoring a broader context.73
In many instances, treatises may serve the same purposes, bolstering an
argument or shutting off further debate. But justices seem also to turn to
treatises to enhance their understanding of areas of law they rarely encoun-
ter. Justice Sotomayor seems to have used two treatises on fraudulent con-
veyances and the history of commercial fraud at common law for this
purpose in a section of her opinion for the Court in Husky International
Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a bankruptcy case.74
In the treatise category, I include what might more precisely be called
practice manuals, such as a manual on the defense of drunk-driving cases
cited by both Justice Alito and Justice Sotomayor in Birchfield v. North Da-
kota, a drunk-driving case;75 such books seem to serve the same purpose as
treatises. As with other categories of books, citation frequency varied widely
during the Term. Justice Thomas cited treatises twenty-two times, Justice
Kagan twice, and Justice Kennedy four times.
Treatises, including manuals, constitute by far the biggest category of
cited books: forty-seven, more than one-third of the total. The number is so
relatively large not necessarily because justices are especially treatise depen-
dent, but because they turn to treatises to address questions specific to the
case at hand. That means that very few treatises in OT 15 were cited by
multiple justices; dictionaries, on the other hand, were cited en masse, with
nineteen citations by seven different justices to Black’s Law Dictionary and
eight citations to the Oxford English Dictionary.76 (Similarly, although jus-
tices cited six different restatements (Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Judg-
ments, Restitution, Torts, and Trusts), three of those received only one
citation. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments was cited by Justices Breyer,
70. Id. at 488.
71. Id. at 566.
72. Id. at 523–26.
73. Id. at 540.
74. See 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1587–88 (2016) (first citing Orlando F. Bump, Fraudulent
Conveyances: A Treatise Upon Conveyances Made by Debtors to Defraud Creditors
(3d ed. 1882); and then citing Garrard Glenn, The Law of Fraudulent Conveyances
(1931)).
75. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2167, 2191 (2016) (majority opinion by Alito, J.) (citing 2 Richard
E. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases (3d ed. 2015)); id. at 2191–92 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the same).
76. Citations to the Concise Oxford Dictionary and New Oxford American Dictionary are
excluded from this count.
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Alito, and Sotomayor, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts was cited by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.)
The only two treatises cited by more than two justices writing in sepa-
rate cases were Wright and Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure, cited by
six justices,77 and Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, cited by three.78
“Stern and Gressman,”79 the bible for Supreme Court practice, was cited by
only Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas.80 While it’s hard to believe that
there is any justice (or law clerk) who doesn’t turn regularly to Stern and
Gressman, perhaps those three are the only ones candid enough not to pre-
tend to have learned by heart the volume’s 1,530 pages.
Conclusion: And What About Law?
From time to time—but not very often—the justices did actually turn
to books about law. Holmes’ The Common Law made one appearance, a
reference by Justice Thomas in his dissenting opinion in Voisine v. United
States.81 So did more recent work of the sort that might be discussed in this
Michigan Law Review issue: Bruce Ackerman’s We the People: Transforma-
tions, cited by Justice Alito in Evenwel v. Abbott82 and Akhil Reed Amar’s
America’s Constitution: A Biography, cited in Evenwel by both Justice Alito
and Justice Thomas.83 Justice Sotomayor included in her Utah v. Strieff dis-
sent three recent books by law professors dealing with race and the criminal
justice system: Michelle Alexander’s best-selling The New Jim Crow; The
Eternal Criminal Record by James B. Jacobs; and The Miner’s Canary by Lani
Guinier and Gerald Torres.84
77. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2308 (2016) (majority
opinion by Breyer, J.); id. at 2335 (Alito, J., dissenting); Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v.
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2152 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct.
1310, 1327 (2016) (majority opinion by Ginsburg, J.); Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1333 n.1
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016)
(majority opinion by Kennedy, J.); Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1057 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2073 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Universal
Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 n.3 (2016) (majority opinion by
Thomas, J.); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (Roberts, C.J.,
writing for the Court).
79. Supreme Court Practice (Shapiro et al. eds., 10th ed. 2013).
80. Justices Alito and Roberts cited “Stern and Gressman” in their respective opinions for
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). Since those opinions were written for the same case,
this book was not included in the group of popularly cited treatises above.
81. 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2284 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing O. W. Holmes, Jr., The
Common Law (1881)).
82. 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1147 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing 2 Bruce Ackerman, We
the People: Transformations (1998)).
83. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1139 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Akhil Reed Amar,
America’s Constitution: A Biography (2005)); id. at 1145 nn.5–6, 1149 (Alito, J., concur-
ring) (citing the same).
84. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (first citing James B.
Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record (2015); then citing Michelle Alexander, The
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Seven justices, all except Justice Kennedy (and Justice Scalia), cited at
least one book about law, but aside from Justice Sotomayor in Strieff, there
was an almost random quality to the use the justices made of such books.
Justice Breyer obviously had reason to look into the Puerto Rican Constitu-
tion for his dissenting opinion in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, a criminal
case on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.85 But what was there
about Telford Taylor’s Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation that in-
spired Justice Alito to cite this forty-seven-year-old book in his opinion for
the Court in a drunk-driving case, Birchfield v. North Dakota?86
Aside from Akhil Reed Amar’s American’s Constitution, the only book
about law to receive more than one citation was Antonin Scalia’s and Bryan
A. Garner’s 2012 Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, cited by
Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan. It will be interesting to see in fu-
ture terms how this volume fares in the citation count. Were any of these
justices—or all of them—offering a one-time gesture of respect to their de-
parted colleague, or will this book enter the tiny canon of frequently cited
books about law?
It’s fitting to end this Foreword with a question, because this journey
through the justices’ collective bookshelves during the 2015 Term raises as
many questions as it answers. I have indulged the conceit that it was the
justices, and not their law clerks, who selected the books to cite, in much the
same way that we treat Supreme Court opinions as if the justices write every
word of the opinions that bear their names. In fact, the process for both is
probably collaborative, rather than either/or. It’s hard to believe that rogue
law clerks withheld dictionaries from Justice Kennedy or forced treatises on
Justice Thomas. I assume that the patterns that emerged during OT 15, if
not every citation in every opinion, reflect the justices’ actual preferences.
It would also be useful, for an energetic researcher of the future, to
probe further and cross-check the opinions against the briefs submitted in
each case. That would show whether the books that appear in the published
opinions, especially the more obscure ones, were introduced into the Court
via the briefs, as opposed to occurring spontaneously to the justices or crop-
ping up in law clerk research. I did not take this further step. Better to tempt
readers than to try their patience.
New Jim Crow (2010); and then citing Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Miner’s Ca-
nary (2002)).
85. 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1882 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Antonio Ferno´s-Isern,
Original Intent in the Constitution of Puerto Rico (2d ed. 2002)).
86. 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2175 (2016) (citing Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitu-
tional Interpretation (1969)).
